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The Politics and Poetics of Spaces and
Places: Mapping the Multiple
Geographies of Identity in a Cultural
Posthuman Era
Julia J A Shaw
De Montfort University, Leicester
Hillary J Shaw
London School of Commerce, London
As transcendent technologies, information communication technologies
(ICTs) exist beyond the divergent equivalence of human categories of differ-
ence such as race, gender, and class, as well as operating outside traditional
binary oppositions such as good/bad, love/hate, and rational/irrational.
While a material grounding in earlier forms of embodied social experience
remains a necessary prerequisite of interaction with virtual systems, a vast col-
lection of technological applications now exhibit some degree of agency as
they interact with humans and their environment. This development has enor-
mous consequences for human life, human flourishing, and social organis-
ation, raising significant ethical concerns relevant to public and policy
debates. It is, therefore, pertinent to explore key epistemological questions
relating to the radical and accelerated remapping of the limits of what it
now means to be human. While this article does not purport to offer a prag-
matic solution, it constitutes an interdisciplinary conceptual platform from
which to consider the nature of the evolving human-nonhuman-machine
relationship and the possible implications for humanity, civilisation, and
other forms of social organisation in the modern hypermediated world. It is
suggested that, by reflecting on the various representations of contemporary
technoculture and biotechnology from the perspective of the arts and huma-
nities, it may be possible to isolate those important questions which relate
to subjectivity, ethics, community, and social transformation in order to
prepare the groundwork for a comprehensive and critical theory of technology.
journal of organisational transformation & social change, Vol. 0 No. 0, Month 2015, 1–22
© Taylor & Francis 2015 DOI 10.1080/14779633.2015.1101254
KEYWORDS posthuman, information communication technologies, hypermedia-
tion, culture, identity, transformation, social organisation, critical theory
Introduction
The largely unfettered realm of hardware and software codes offers limitless possi-
bilities in expanding the use and influence of information communication technol-
ogies (ICTs), even facilitating various public and private activities relating to the
involuntary involvement and surveillance of others, which are often beyond law
and regulation. Aside from the problematic privacy implications of augmented
reality glasses and self-driving cars, there are many constructive dimensions to the
technosocial world, such as the life-saving integration of electronic and auxiliary
biological systems, ranging from the invention of pacemakers and the construction
of artificial hearts to replacement robot limbs which interact with the brain. Using
functional magnetic resonance imaging, it is already possible to ascertain a great
deal of information about an individual’s brain activity and thought processes
with a high degree of accuracy, which is invaluable in treating brain injuries. The
Arab Spring is generally mooted to have spread due to the ubiquity and popularity
of social media, specifically Facebook and Twitter, and exemplifies the potentiality
for disaffected individuals to mobilise en masse online against repressive regimes
of power. Although, since the final outcome is dependent on more tangible forces,
the extent to which networked resistance can overcome hierarchical power is at
best questionable. This tends to be a common complaint of online activists that
shared discontents among members of the wired community do not often translate
into tangible positive outcomes in lived experience. In any event, the energy needed
to take to the streets and protest, particularly in Western countries, is often dissi-
pated by having articulated those protestations online. Along with the soporific
effect of information overload, this era is characterised not only by an increase in
interrelations, integrating trends, and accelerated development but also by a
growth in contradictions. From time and labour-saving digitised work patterns,
which tend to overwhelm and enervate, to the development of nuclear power,
which avoids harmful greenhouse gas emissions yet contains the seeds of human-
kind’s destruction, technological advancements are too often achieved at the poten-
tial and actual cost of human health and happiness.
Propelled ever further from the initial conditions of the real world, an intensifica-
tion of the information generation process is claimed by Baudrillard to signify the
inevitable and irreversible ‘critical threshold of universal instantaneity of infor-
mation’ (1995: 137 AQ2
¶
). As advanced technological systems reproduce for the sole
purpose of reproducibility — a controllable, encodable, and endlessly adaptable
reproducibility in which the ‘finality is there in advance inscribed in the code’ —
we are presented with an experimental facsimile of the catastrophic end of the uni-
verse (Baudrillard, 1993: 50). In The Age of Spiritual Machines, Kurzweil outdid
Baudrillard by predicting the epoch of techno-transcendence, the tipping point at
which human intelligence will be totally eclipsed by artificial intelligence. It is
suggested that the virtual world is in the process of transforming the real world
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or, at least, subordinating it as slave to the machine world. By the year 2029, genetic
engineering, nanotechnology, and computer technology will have the capacity to
create transhuman man-machine hybrids which will defeat human biology in its vul-
nerability to disease and death (Kurzweil, 1999). He further speculated that resist-
ance to the march of machine logic was a futile exercise, as those renegade
humans would be unable to meaningfully participate with the majority who will
have been assimilated by the burgeoning posthuman technoculture. This enduring
fear of ‘singularity’ is further explored in a recent film Transcendence, which ques-
tions the nature of identity, authenticity, and subjectivity as the real self merges with
a digital self in the virtual realm to create an autonomous and hostile artificial intel-
ligence (Pfister, 2014). As the imbalance of power between humans and the posthu-
man accelerates with each technological innovation, the anticipated epoch of the
machine is depicted as both modern miracle and monster.
The common feature between this bleak dystopian view of the future and the
present day is the growing inability of individuals to model their own identity
and long-term prospects outside the possible contexts of various technological
mediums. The infinite circulation of information which reshapes and creates
new meaning undermines the importance of embodied creative processes and
human reason as the locus for social change and regeneration. Furthermore, pat-
terns of work and social life are expressed and facilitated via various technological
media and a lack of access to these forms of communication equates to being ostra-
cised to the wrong side of the digital divide. Baroness Neville-Rolfe said in a recent
House of Lords debate that ‘Broadband and mobile coverage have become essen-
tial utilities, like water or power. Without coverage it is like living in the old world
without a post box or hot water’.1 As social life becomes increasingly complex, the
perfunctory blurring of boundaries between human and machine comprises a
dangerous reductionism in the way we think about and readily accommodate
the use of progressively sophisticated technological tools. Too often, without con-
sidering the societal or personal impact, ‘people act in response to culturally trans-
mitted ideas that are embedded in symbolic representations of structural
information’ (Yolles, 2010: 361). It is suggested, therefore, that any critique of
ICTs must engage with these new hypermediated cultural forms, technosocial
relationships and constellations of power as linear and continuous; whether in
the form of, for example, discourse, metaphysics of presence, or meta-narratives.
This article hopes to exemplify the utility of a philosophical overview by concep-
tualising the transformative power of technology and the implications for human
agency, social organisation, identity, and social exclusion from the perspectives of
post-structuralism, sociology, cyberculture, and science fiction.
The technological transformation of social space
Individuals do not occupy an undifferentiated social space. Aside from technological
and economic criteria, cultural and symbolic distinctions such as literature, history,
science, religion, economics, politics, and the law tend to constitute discrete worlds
characterised by their own policies and modes of authority. These distinct fields are
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historically conceived and, through various acts of interpretation, have acquired
autonomy in the social sphere over important considerations such as whether to
prioritise scientific rigour and originality over commercial gain or political expe-
diency. Over time, each field has developed the ability to insulate itself from external
forces and to maintain its own standards of evaluation above and against those of
alternative or intrusive fields. For Foucault these discursive processes identify
what is meaningful and constitute the local socio-historical material conditions
that support and constrain disciplinary knowledge traditions (1980: 196–98).
While the exercise of particular restrictions and realisation of future possibilities
are imposed on those who engage with a particular field, the existing structures
and practices are constantly challenged by others who would seek to modify the hier-
archy and arbitrary imposition of identity within that discipline. The evolving influ-
ence of transnational migration and social mobility means the social milieu is a
constant battleground between those who uphold those autonomous principles of
judgement which define a particular field and those who would substitute heter-
onomous principles which allow the inclusion of new ideas and external influences.
Civilisation, while providing the conditions for the existence and development of
culture, relies on culture for its continuing existence and progression and is, there-
fore, fundamentally connected to technological advancement.
Both culture and civilisation are dependent upon the shared meanings that exist
between individuals within a social space, which is at the same time a political
space: a necessarily contested area in which individuals organise their ‘position’
in relation to others and against dogmatic classificatory schema, via practices of
self-representation, as ‘part and parcel of their social reality’. The construction
of social identity is then simply a matter of modifying or maintaining ‘reality’,
so that individuals and communities are defined as much by their ‘perceived
being’ or belonging, as by simply ‘being’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 564). For Bourdieu,
this ‘ubiquitous state of conflict’, or competitive struggle, is what characterises col-
lective human life. When the ‘dominated classes’ unselfconsciously accept the con-
ditions imposed on them by the ‘dominant classes’ they are reinforcing the very
structures that restrict and oppress them: ‘those who enter this chase, in which
they are beaten before they start as the constancy of the gaps testifies, implicitly
recognize the legitimacy of the goals pursued by those whom they pursue, by the
mere fact of taking part’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 165). In other words, the dominated
classes seek validation via the symbols of power and cultural status — those cat-
egories of value — which represent ‘hierarchies of legitimacy’ and identify them
with a higher standing in society. Endorsement of the other is an integral part,
therefore, of acknowledging the political subject because our identity depends
on the recognition of others to the extent that ‘misrecognition can inflict harm,
can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted and
reduced mode of being’ (Taylor, 1994: 25). This struggle for recognition continues
to be ‘the master principle of society’ because only by being granted a name, a
place, and a function within a group or institution, can the individual hope to
escape the ‘contingency, finitude, and ultimate absurdity of existence’ (Wacquant,
2008: 264). Meanwhile, the dominant group ensures the gap is always narrowed
to prevent outsiders having access to equal privilege, power, and standing;
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engaging in post-social practices of exclusion, facilitated by advanced security
measures such as gated communities, public schools, members-only clubs,
private airport lounges, and other restricted spaces of enclosure which prevent
any encounter with the other or the real.
While the idea of a world directed by human laws and made great by human
initiative, endeavour, and passion has to some extent been superseded, the idealised
cyber-community is often purported to assume an antagonistic relationship with the
real. The difference between human-directed principles and physically-bounded
laws of nature versus the unlimited temporal and spatial possibilities of the internet
presents a range of seemingly impossible dualisms: intuition and rationality, sen-
sation and ideas, body and machine. Such differences, for Bourdieu, always
produce a hierarchy which, in turn, triggers the endless dialectic of distinction and
pretension, recognition and misrecognition, arbitrariness and necessity. New tech-
nologies are too often competitive with, rather than complementary to, the existing
norms of the real world and are not readily subject to legal or moral censure. At any
given time, an interconnected set of tracking devices captures our every action and,
following the Snowden revelations and the US National Security Agency’s ‘Prism’
debacle, the legitimacy of cybersecurity mechanisms versus privacy remains a con-
tentious area — although the founder of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, famously
claimed that privacy can no longer be relied upon as a ‘social norm’ (Greenwald
& MacAskill, 2013; Johnson, 2010). While crime prevention is a legitimate aim,
widespread surveillance and monitoring arguably are driven primarily by the con-
cerns of government operating in an often orchestrated climate of fear, rather
than as a response to the actual experience of crime (van Munster, 2011). In
addition, the economic capital accumulated by the knowledge corporations allows
the manipulation of reality and privileging of particular interests affecting political
power, financial markets, consumer behaviour, employment policies, and welfare
standards. It follows that the technologies and interests of those who ‘own’ and
control them are embedded into what Fuchs describes as ‘structures of domination’
(2008: 114).
The locale of struggle is complicated by the absence or presence of specific phys-
ical properties so it is inevitable that the realm of inquiry has shifted from not only
who has the capacity to influence the structures of power and principles of control
but also whatmediums are capable of upholding or changing the representation of
reality, in mediating human experience and social interactions. It has been argued
that contemporary consumption-focused, media-fixated, and event-driven culture
has not only resituated but reimagined human relationships. People have been
encultured into a variety of habits and understandings which are a source of
both assimilation and alienation, comprising an agonistic alliance in which,
vying for supremacy, one party assumes the other and both willingly engage in a
conflictual relationship. Cyberculture, in common with other social practices, is
a contested terrain and not immune from power struggles, biased information
flows, or cultural hegemonic influences which control such areas as domain
names, usage, bandwidth, speed and access — restrictions which contribute to
the digital divide. As the traditional territories of social interaction have been dis-
rupted and relocated, it is first necessary to explore the possibility of resistance and
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positive transformative possibilities within the new normalising knowledge dis-
courses of assimilation and global ICT hierarchies in order to prepare the ground-
work for social critique.
Post-social technologies and emergence of the posthuman
subject
The development of new technologies, scientific progress, and economic change
has reimagined the dynamics of social space and the lived experience and
created novel challenges, not least of which in relation to the transgressive
human-nonhuman-machine interface. In light of this, epistemological questions
relating to human exceptionalism or anthropocentrism and what it now means to
be human have been explored via a diverse range of academic, scientific, aesthetic,
and literary forms. In recent works, the traditional civilisational social model as a
locus of thoughts, shared values, and interaction in relation to social justice,
social cohesion, and political thought has been supplanted with the idea of the ‘post-
human’, on which there are many views but little consensus. Some welcome the post-
human landscape as a unique opportunity to ‘critically and creatively [think] about
who and what we are actually in the process of becoming’ as well as affording the
opportunity to forge ‘multiple allegiances and new ecologies of belonging that can
redefine cosmopolitanism’ (Braidotti, 2013: 12, 183). Such opinions debunk the
myth of humanity as an impossible ideal which has always excluded individuals
who failed to fit the category of ‘human’ and so were denied the full panoply of
legal rights and protections afforded to others. In the late-eighteenth century, for
example, Western European single women were taught accomplishments such as
music, needlepoint, and etiquette rather than academic subjects, and had few politi-
cal, employment, or educational rights. Married women possessed no legal identity:
they were unable to retain the services of a lawyer, make contracts, or even have
rights over their own children. An overarching patriarchal model reserved power
and privilege for men meaning ‘not all of us can say, with any degree of certainty,
that we have always been human, or that we are only that. Some of us are not
even considered fully human now’ (Braidotti, 2013: 1). The post-gender posthuman
perspective despatches any hierarchical notion of the ‘natural self’ while presenting
technosocial reality as one which may be free from biologically-based oppression.
The fictional and real world imagery associated with the human-machine cyborg,
however, tends to be predominantly hyper-masculine (Darth Vader, The Terminator,
RoboCop, Iron Man, Neo from The Matrix, military applications of technoscience
etc.). In conforming to modernism’s patriarchal dualistic assumptions, this con-
ception smuggles in another form of gender stereotyping. In addition, although
becoming a cyborg would confer greater powers on individuals than those who
remained human, the remaining humans would likely become a subspecies
(Warwick, 2002: 157). For Hayles, the posthuman goes beyond body modification
and metaphorical and actual biological limitations, as it esteems information over
materiality and situates the body as a prosthetic extension of the mind, being charac-
terised by four main assumptions:
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First, the posthuman view privileges information pattern over material instantiation, so
that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an
inevitability of life. Second the posthuman view considers consciousness regarded as the
seat of human identity in the Western tradition long before Descartes thought he was a
mind thinking, as in epiphenomenon, as evolutionary upstart trying to claim that is the
whole show when in actuality it is only a minor sideshow. Third, the posthuman view
thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learned to manipulate, so that extend-
ing or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that
began before we were born. Fourth, and most important, by these and other means, the
posthuman view configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with
intelligent machines. (Hayles, 1999: 3, 34 AQ3
¶
)
If human consciousness can be uploaded as information and moved between bodies
or computers in the manner of extropian Hans Moravec’s theory of ‘transmigration’
inMind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence, then the body is no
longer of central importance. The removal of the line between machine, mind, and
computer means there are no longer ‘essential differences or absolute demarcations
between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and
bodily organism, robot technology and human goals’ (Hayles, 1999: 3). This tech-
nological separation of mind and body has profound implications for culture and
civilisation. Similarly for Foucault in The Order of Things, ‘the idea of man’, as
human consciousness, morality, and existence, is profoundly historical and simply
an effect of language, desire, and the unconscious. Fashioned by dominant dis-
courses within which its authority was constructed and like a face drawn in the
sand at the edge of the sea, he predicts the concept and ‘era of man’ as coming to
an end (Foucault, 1970: 386, 387). This does not describe a world without
humans, rather, it refers to a different understanding, an evolution, of what we
understand by the concept of ‘human’. This is an idea taken up by Baudrillard
and McLuhan, who suggest that the ubiquity of digital media along with an attend-
ant implosion of meaning in the media have destabilised any shared sense of reality
and rendered the real world of objects and human experience obsolete. The effect of
substituting the real with a world of signification or ‘hyperreality’ is claimed to have
been so far-reaching as to permanently change human nature.
In his lecture on ‘Aesthetic Illusion and Virtual Reality’, Baudrillard expressed the
view that, while there is always a hidden camera somewhere filming us without our
knowledge, our entire life has taken on a ‘video dimension’ because of the more dis-
turbing effect of the ‘virtual camera’ in our head (1997: 19). E.M. Forster’s The
Machine Stops depicts a technologically mediated individual who becomes so
removed from nature that they no longer comprehend their total alienation from
what is real; freedom of mobility has become synonymous with, even replaced by,
maximum connectivity and utility (2011). The constantly updated iPad and smart-
phone exemplify the modern ideal of maximum mobility and utility, with a range of
apps from pocket yoga to augmented reality (AR) urban exploration; using AR tech-
nology a walk in the park becomes a shopping experience allowing the user to
browse, even feel, items on sale. Similarly, watching television, web-surfing, and
playing chess with friends on different continents are all possible from the device,
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replicating the home as a basis for engaging in such activities. Recently patented
‘Google Glass’, with bone induction technology, transforms the individual into a
machine by interpreting visual and aural data encountered by the user, projecting
this as a series of words and images via pop-ups onto a small screen worn as spec-
tacles, obviating the need for the user to process the information for themselves. Fea-
turing an integrated phone, internet connection, GPS, and camera, the user can take
live photographs, share video with others, and web-surf via voice-activated com-
mands while moving around in the physical social space. Aside from issues of
privacy (surreptitious surveillance of unsuspecting others) taken to the extreme,
this hypermobility reverses into immobility consequent on the loss of corporeal
awareness and lack of autonomy, since almost everything can be conducted and
interpreted by the device. For Merleau-Ponty, the body can adapt and extend
itself via ‘literal’ or external devices and, after acquiring the ability to perceive the
world through the device, it ceases to exist, having been absorbed, it now constitutes
an essential part of what it means to be (1962: 440). A saturation of information and
identity-shifting possibilities means that, while knowing and being everything at
once is realisable, what is ‘relative, concrete and particular in life’ is destroyed
and, most importantly, ‘one is in contradiction with oneself’ which leads to an
incomplete sphere of existence (Kierkegaard, 2010: 62, 68).
While there is some anxiety over the loss of identity that may result from techno-
logical hypermediations of self and reality and a danger that social enterprise
imagination and thought has become subjugated by the overarching technocultural
imagination, it does not follow that all technological advancement is detrimental. As
Foucault points out ‘everything is dangerous is not exactly the same as [everything
is] bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do […] every
day [we must] determine which is the main danger’ (1997: 256). Ed Hutchins rejects
the claim that cognitive science has even been able to model the formal, abstract, and
symbolic higher functions of the human mind, in part because these are dependent
on context, culture, and history (1995: 202, 363). Just as we encounter machines
everyday which exceed the total of our cognitive capacity without any threat to
our autonomy, such as satellite navigation systems and driverless cars such as the
Induct Technology Navia, decision making is distributed between equal human
and non-human participants without posing a threat or being anti-human. As
Hutchins (1995) points out, however, it is only through embodied human effort
and imagination that such smart devices have been conceived in order to improve
our working, leisure, and home environments. Even though writers like Hayles
have written about the body as a ‘pattern not a presence’ and contemplated the
future disembodiment of information, she still reasons that social, technological,
political, and cultural changes can be advantageous to a transformed humanity.
As long as the human subject is conceptualised as autonomous with unambiguous
boundaries, the complex interplay of both human and nonhuman can be viewed
with optimism:
If my nightmare is a culture inhabited by posthumans who regard their bodies as fashion
accessories rather than the ground of being, my dream is a version of the posthuman that
embraces the possibilities of information technologies […] that recognizes and celebrates
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finitude as a condition of human being, and that understands human life is embedded in
a material world of great complexity […] If the posthuman could accomplish this, who
would mourn for the human? (Hayles, 1999: 8)
This proactive approach also constitutes an embracing of technology, enclosing and
enfolding it before it enfolds, overwhelms, and assimilates us. Cleary, between the
Luddites and technophiles, there is an initial problem of classifying these new tech-
nosocial spaces and interfaces: as essential, a threat to the future of humankind or, as
others claim, simply complex socio-political and economic contexts within which
end users bring with them their own ethical and cultural complexities.
Symbolic social interaction, hypermediation, and transparency
Castells describes the newly emergent spatial form of social interaction which dis-
tinguishes and transforms social practices that inform and influence the network
society as ‘the space of flows’, which facilitates ‘the material organization of time-
sharing social practices that work through flows’ which are rooted in techno
savvy urban structures (2000: 442, 447 AQ4
¶
). Yet the city is not just a set of processes
and networks, it is a discursive space which contains the possibility of enhancing
sociability mediated by physical interconnectedness. Communities produce instinc-
tive and tacit collective memories, founded on the concept of a poetics of space in
which they have learned to live and flourish. The concept of a poetics of space
implies meaning is given to a social space because of the social relationships
forged between things and people; it is the expression of society (Lefebvre, 1991:
83). In this sense, societies construct and define meaningful space within which a
lawful and peaceful society is ordered according to the consistent and constant per-
formance of social habits, founded on a set of informal rules underpinned by values,
which allow people to plan and organise their lives without undue interference in
those of others. A multiplicity of elements of different kinds are so related to each
other that ‘we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal
part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expec-
tations which have a good chance of proving correct’ (Hayek, 1973: 36). As society
is a spontaneous order, it follows that repeated social exchanges create expectations
about how others will and ought to behave. While the dissolution of the traditional
relationship between the public and private spheres has resulted in a modified sense
of one’s place in the world in which the physical space no longer determines our
social interactions and experiences, we still inhabit a physical locality, referred to
by medium theorist Meyrowitz as a ‘glocality’ (1985: 107).
While glocalites provide a conveniently desituated context for any number of non-
sequential and overlapping experiences via the interconnected global matrix of con-
temporary cultural phenomena, a downside is that, ‘as a result of multiple
mediations of our experience, we can come to live in places without ever fully inte-
grating into the place-defined community, such as the local government, local com-
munity groups or local religious organizations’ (Meyrowitz, 2005: 27). This new
public space is constituted by anonymous spectators who have no first-hand connec-
tion with the event or issue, possibly no relevant expertise, or specialist skill, yet are
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able to express an opinion or take a stand without assuming any responsibility for
the consequences. Not only is their participation risk-free, since there is no commit-
ment, there is also no threat of humiliation, loss, or disappointment. Individuals are
free to engage in unconditionally anonymous and ephemeral encounters, without
having to invest in a consistent or authentic identity; web life encourages commit-
ment and consequence-free experimentation as only the self is relevant. While exem-
plifying certain characteristics of the postmodern alienated and decentred subject,
for Marshall McLuhan this disposition is also dangerously narcissistic:
The youth Narcissus mistook his own reflection in the water for another person. This
extension of himself by mirror numbed his perceptions until he became the servome-
chanism of his own extended or repeated image. The nymph Echo tried to win his
love with fragments of his own speech, but in vain. He was numb. He had adapted to
his extension of himself and had become a closed system. (McLuhan, 1994: 63)
The look-at-me, friend-me, follow-me popularity of Facebook, Twitter, and Insta-
gram exemplifies the fascination by any representation of the individual in material
other than themselves, creating the illusion of otherness when in reality this provides
only a hall of mirrors which infinitely reflects back to one’s own reflection. The
phenomenon of the ‘selfie’ authenticates the self via images rather than relationships,
and similarly reveals a desire for one’s own productions rather than contact with
authentic others. Just as Echo failed to distract Narcissus from his own likeness, indi-
viduals are losing their authentic sense of self and becoming in thrall to a temporary
and artificial world. Like the social displacement of those drivers too distracted by
texting or talking on their mobile phones to be able to steer properly or brake in
time, Narcissus could not see beyond his own reflections and was insensate to the
cries of the beautiful nymph Echo. The public performance of the mobile phone con-
versation is an example of narcissism and social displacement as the interaction
occurs within a hybrid conversational place or ‘third space’, within which, like
Schrödinger’s cat, both parties are neither mutually present nor absent. When the
user interacts with others via their digital communicative device in real time, the
boundaries between the virtual and real sphere are dissolved; yet the presence of
others seems irrelevant to either the volume of the exchange or personal nature of
information being divulged by the person in the crowded train carriage, supermar-
ket, or even cinema. This strident act of defiance against subtly-coded social norms is
symptomatic of disorientation and disengagement within a previously conceded pre-
dictable (or predictably subdued) shared environment. The ubiquity of mobile com-
munication devices means such acts of conspicuous conversation are routinely
performed in public spaces, transforming the traditional private versus public
nature of social contexts: ‘the orientations of cell phones/new media truncate our
reciprocal relation with the Earth, stunting our senses and incarcerating ourselves
in a technosoliloquy’ (Seegert, 2011: 47) In this way a complex network of commu-
nicative technologies not only mediates our everyday interactions, it also partici-
pates in and, to a significant extent, shapes the social.
Human social interactions have been modified in a variety of ways due to the
socio-cultural impact of communication media:
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• change in social relationships such as distance-working and web-based inter-
action with non-human agents
• increased variety of contexts for social engagement enlarging the possibility of
different types of interaction, such as online dating and chat forums, and
• creation of new social roles.
We no longer use technology to facilitate communication in the workplace and
between each other as friends and consumers, rather, the way in which we interact
with the medium is altering our informal habits and culture. McLuhan claimed some
fifty years ago that the dominant medium has a formative role in manipulating the
way in which we perceive, understand, and interact with the ‘mass media’ which, in
turn, has a profound effect on the world around us. This symbiotic relationship is
summarised in his famous maxim ‘the medium is the message’ (McLuhan, 1964:
7 AQ5
¶
). A saturation of news reports, entertainment broadcasts, and images sourced
from global agencies representing a diverse range of events and issues increases
the individual’s socio-cognitive repertoire. Yet, as Baudrillard claimed in The Gulf
War Did Not Take Place, a hypermediated representation enables the creative
reconstruction of an event so that it is neither real nor unreal: ‘the closer we suppo-
sedly approach the real or the truth, the further we draw away from them both, since
neither one nor the other exists’ (1995b: 49). The event is reconstructed as spectacle
and takes place in a new place, created by technology. Aristotle similarly observed in
Rhetoric that all communication is persuasive communication. This daily diet of
information delivered by increasingly recognisable media ‘personalities’ and ‘celeb-
rities’ is held by McLuhan to increase the sense of disjunction from one’s own
grounded life-world (within which significance and meaning are determined by
our lived experiences):
[W]hen things come at you very fast, naturally you lose touch with yourself. Anybody
moving into a new world loses identity […] So loss of identity is something that
happens in rapid change. But everybody at the speed of light tends to become a
nobody. This is what’s called the masked man. The masked man has no identity. He is
so deeply involved in other people that he doesn’t have any personal identity. (quoted
in Benedetti & DeHart, 1996: 33–34)
To some extent, this is always the case in all social interactions: while the self is
embodied it is not circumscribed but is continually renegotiated, ‘we must be
others before we are ourselves’ and ‘existence precedes essence’ (Mead, 1964;
Sartre, 1958 AQ6
¶
). This is a recursive practice which binds individuals, uncritically, to
the judgement of others, while, at the same time, the saturation of persuasive
images, icons, indexes, and the phenomenon of ‘self-reflexive’ hypermediation
mean that information is presented in a highly stylised and self-referential format
which arguably avoids transparency. Like the imaginary world discovered in an
encyclopaedia, in Jorge Luis Borges short story Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius
(1982), it comprises an idealist society in which Tlön language has no nouns and
replaces Spanish and French, material objects have no existence, and the main dis-
cipline is psychology because its citizens understand the universe as nothing but a
series of intellectual processes. Yet the simple and coherent structure of this
THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF SPACES AND PLACES 11
alternative world is so compelling that it has infiltrated and superimposed itself on
our own: even the history taught in schools excludes real history. We are similarly
flattered by the interface in which human achievement becomes a matter of being
able to deftly switch between layers of windows displaying a myriad of perspectives.
Those intangible aspects comprising the soul of technological mediums, media, and
our relationship to them — who or what comes between the screen, content, and
user — remains, therefore, largely unexplicated and even concealed, with impli-
cations for regulation as well as for culture and society.
Participatory technoculture: connected communities or digital
divide?
The blurring of reality and the imaginary, being and appearance, knowledge and
belief is commonplace as life has become organised around various enslaving com-
municative mediums, without which full participation in collective social life is
impossible. Without doubt, the resettlement of immigrants within new online ima-
gined communities can ease security concerns in both their country of origin and
host society. In such cases, digital diasporas have been evidenced to facilitate identity
negotiation and create communities and organisations that represent hybrid identi-
ties and encourage solidarity and material benefits among their members (Brinkerh-
off, 2009). Such mobilities are fundamental to the reorganisation of space and time
because of their capacity to re-order both. The web is a supreme exemplar of an
agent of change as it provides, not least of all, a technosocial locus for new modes
of expression and ways of thinking about oneself and others in the world, compris-
ing a socially, rather than geographically, constructed ethnoscape. As a transcendent
technology, it exists beyond the divergent equivalence of human categories of differ-
ence such as race, gender, and class, as well as operating outside traditional binary
oppositions such as good/bad, love/hate, rational/irrational. The technospace pro-
vides the possibility of cultural deterritorialisation, providing an opportunity for dis-
parate mobile groups such as immigrants, refugees, and travellers to create new
identities out of ‘multiple possible existences’ (Appadurai, 1990: 287). The continu-
ity and discontinuity of cultural practices between different spaces is then given
greater emphasis rather than their differences and disruptive properties.
Communities are not only defined by their ideologies, membership, and affilia-
tions, but also by their boundaries: who and what are included and excluded. So
then computer illiteracy, lack of conforming to online community membership stan-
dards, language difficulties, or not understanding the norms of interaction in virtual
spaces can all be barriers to full online participation. In 2013, the UK Department of
Work and Pensions revised its welfare benefit system to be ‘digital by default’,
meaning all applications for Universal Credit must be made online. Over seventy
organisations representing councils, charities, trades unions, and housing associ-
ations have raised concerns, including community charity Citizens Advice which
warned: ‘this risks causing difficulties to the 8.5 million people who have never
used the Internet and a further 14.5 million who have virtually no ICT skills’
(ONS Statistical Bulletin, 2011). Although telephone and some face-to-face
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assistance were available at the outset, many claimants are elderly, disabled, or
homeless and this initial provision has not made the claims process any easier, as
the following case illustrates:
Like many claimants we work with, the gentleman in question had never used a compu-
ter before. This made it a much more laborious process. First, we had to set up an email
account so that he could receive communication about the success or failure of his appli-
cation. It soon became apparent that he did not know how to use a mouse. Following a
quick tutorial, we then proceeded to set up an account on the local authority’s homepage
to update his application. After about an hour and a half together he had a vague under-
standing of the notification system, but he was still keen to return to us for help in check-
ing his emails. Sadly [we] don’t have the capacity to do this. I informed him that he would
have to use the free computers next door in the library, but I’m not convinced he’ll
manage to do it alone. (Price, 2014)
Comprising an infinite set of sub-cultures within an overarching technoculture, the
possibility of multiple geographically-unbounded social encounters based on a
plethora of common causes and shared interests has led to the web being described
as the ultimate connected society or ‘Big Society’. So, as informational needs grow so
does the need for research into appropriate redistributive models which are capable
of recognising and addressing the needs of educationally and culturally disadvan-
taged groups, along with the increasing ranks of low-income users, who arguably
have the most to benefit from enhanced internet flexibility and fair pricing of
devices, bandwidth, and speed. Although some practical improvements have been
made, for example, the availability of more computers for general use in public
libraries, the development of a more advanced conceptual vocabulary is necessary
if the vision of a fully-inclusive online society is to be realised.
For the fully-connected, the emphasis remains only on the instrumental nature of
humanity, in terms of satisfying the barest needs from human relations, which recalls
the spectre of homo economicus, who knew exactly what he was looking for. In an
environment of commodities and needs-related exchange value, for Baudrillard, the
person themselves becomes no more than commodity and exchange value AQ7
¶
. If shared
intimacies are the goal and product of human interaction, then the idea of collections
of lone individuals tapping 24/7 on an infinite number of ubiquitous digital screens
comprises no more than a syndicate of egoisms. For Beck:
What emerges from the fading social norms is a naked, frightened, aggressive ego in
search of itself and an affectionate sociality […] someone who is poking around in the
fog of his or her own self is no longer capable of noticing that this isolation, this solitary-
confinement of the ego is a mass sentence. (Beck, 1995: 40)
The opposite of close familiarity gleaned from authentic presence, atomised behav-
iour characterised by an insidious form of individualism corrupts what it means to
be social in the traditional sense: ‘malnourished’ individualised public spaces of
anomie undermine the ideal of citizenship and citizenship-based politics.
According to Deleuze, we inhabit a world which is characterised by ultra-rapid
and free-floating forms of social control. The coded numerical language of
control not only determines availability or inaccessibility of information, but,
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more significantly, by being so densely interconnected, individuals have become
‘dividuals’, in other words, endlessly divisible and sub-divisible ‘samples, data,
markets or banks’ (Deleuze, 1992: 3). Facebook, for instance, while commonly rep-
resented as a transparent open space where individuals produce and control their
own content, is a profit-oriented capitalist organisation which monitors all online
behaviour by its 1.2 billion users. Like Google’s ubiquitous search engine,
‘private’ data are captured and complex algorithms developed to create preference
profiles which can be used for a range of purposes beyond targeted advertising:
the consumer becomes the commodity. The type of person we are, our propensities
and peculiarities, are detached from us and reconstituted in different ways beyond
our control. Such reimaginations are based on those criteria considered relevant
by the technological power elites: government or state-sanctioned agencies such as
the NSA and GCHQ, corporate actors, or marketing agencies.
A main area of concern is that public discourse mediated by technology is mostly
driven by corporate interests (news broadcasts as infotainment which confounds
the possibility of public debate); individuals are unwittingly conspiring in the
destruction of their actual human habitat and the gradual dissolution of society.
For Bauman, public space has been colonised by private concerns as the public
interest is reduced to mere curiosity about the private lives of others, while simul-
taneously public issues which resist such dilution are becoming all but incompre-
hensible (2006: 37). This is evidenced in the imposition of a self-interested
corporate mindset which prioritises rapid mobility, flexible relations, and short-
term investments, while simultaneously devaluing the spatial and social commit-
ments which produced industrial epoch cities based on the idea of settled commu-
nities and career progression. The quest for standardisation, centralisation, and
automation has created a society with greatly diminished social capital, in which
people have little political influence and are discontented in their state of separation
from the dominant (and largely self-determining) economic and legislative power
bases (Shaw, 2013). Lingis refers to the increasing absence of humans from the
strata of culture which functions as a system of signs as ‘the obsolescence of the
concept of human subjectivity in our sciences and our postmodern philosophy,
the reduction of subjectivity to cybernetic circuitry, and the reduction of human
initiative to the power to precipitate nuclear extinction’ (1989: 1). Furthermore,
the reimagining and recalibration of the fundamental concepts of democracy,
freedom, fairness, and justice have exacerbated the imbalance of power, fostered
feelings of alienation, and contributed to the destabilisation of society. As com-
munication technologies have facilitated a reordering of the basic values of life,
the individual has been reduced to an abstraction: genetic material having physical
and psychic substance, technologically transformable, and comprising little more
than a bare legal concept.
In this current climate of endless technological transformation, it is clear that any
further innovations cannot be left to market forces without first considering the
development of an appropriate monitoring mechanism. At a human level, rational
thought processes restrain ideas which are by nature unruly and require control;
similarly, the influence of ICTs has proliferated to the point where these technologies
also need to be restrained and diluted into the real world in real time.
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The normalising influence of controlling technologies
In the late 1980s, Chief Technologist at XeroxMarkWeiser shared his vision of ‘ubi-
quitous computing’ based on ‘calm technologies’ where computers would sense the
informational and practical needs of humans and perform repetitive mundane tasks
(Weiser et al., 1999). The new world would be a peaceful, comfortable, and aware
environment in which intuitive machine technology would alert us to a shortage of
fridge items and send a text reminder as we pass the supermarket, and programme
AV equipment to play our favourite music on arriving home from work. Science-
fiction writers have for some time been foretelling a world without crime where
criminal activities are anticipated by intelligent machines enabling the pre-petrators
to be apprehended as in Jonathan Nolan’s screenplay for TV network CBS, Person
of Interest. Although a long way from calm computing, recent innovations in mobile
technology supplemented by augmented reality, such as the Google Glass project,
have moved us closer to the point where the line between real life and online life
has blurred almost to the point of dissolution. Flesh and machine are not yet
melded as in Philip K. Dick’s short story Report, made into Hollywood movie Min-
ority Report; even so, it would be imprudent to underestimate the personal, social,
and ethical consequences of any large-scale extension of ourselves AQ8
¶
. While machines
do not determine different kinds of society, they are able to express the social forms
capable of producing and making use of them. The idea of a continuous flow of a
variety of information and instant communication could be construed as a tacit
form of control, not least of which in its capacity to overwhelm and inhibit other,
more tangible, forms of social contact. The structures and processes of digital
change agents suggest newmodes of thinking along with a new lexical map of mean-
ings. These semantic relations are evident in relatively novel yet often vague concepts
such as digital democracy, eGovernment, cybercrime, cyberculture, Web 2.0 and
Web 3.0, or the ‘Semantic Web’.
Two conflicting schools emerge from speculation about technological advance-
ments and future implications. The Utopians anticipate helpful robots, machines
which take on the physically demanding, time consuming, and less intellectually
engaging, boring, and repetitive tasks, along with those that assist in law enforce-
ment, such as those envisaged by the Robocop franchise. The dystopians, alterna-
tively, envisage a world in which human endeavour is rendered inferior or useless
with people enslaved to the whims of the machines, resulting in a zombie apoca-
lypse. Such a society is characterised by (1) an absence of privacy (physical
impact), (2) lack of individual autonomy (intellectually/mentally restrictive), and
(3) negative social and psychological damage to human relationships (emotional
dimension). Various narrative accounts, particularly fantasy folklore and science
fiction, predict ecological disaster and even the end of the world following the cre-
ation of many monsters. Whether or not these futuristic tales prove to be accurate
predictions, they offer a device for ‘othering’ or defamiliarising the present by creat-
ing a utopos, a ‘no place’ or ‘good place’, within which to critique injustices and the
misuse of power. Occasionally such stories prove to be prescient such as William
Gibson’s description of ‘cyberspace’ in his 1986 Burning Chrome and George
Orwell’s depiction of the destructive combination of political and technological
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power in Nineteen Eighty Four, portraying a future in which a range of human and
electronic surveillance agents spy on all forms of human interaction and communi-
cation AQ9
¶
. Legally-sanctioned hierarchical observation techniques permitted the moni-
toring and control of people in hitherto private situations with severe punishments
meted out to those who offended ‘Big Brother’. Orwell’s writing eerily presages
modern phenomena such as manipulation of the mass media, obsessive information
gathering, and the widespread use of CCTV surveillance in modern Britain. Sup-
ported by legislation such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
and the intrusive UK Communications Data Bill (currently before Parliament), the
technologies constitute a legally and technically unlimited ‘panoptic power’ which
functions as an inducement to conforming behaviour: an anticipatory conformity.
The normalising influence of the electronic evaluative process means power is
assured as, even when there is nobody asserting it, the exaggerated visibility of
the subject presents a continual risk of shame and humiliation.
In support of his view that science and technology would eventually obliterate
nature, Baudrillard refers to the 1953 Arthur C. Clarke short story The Nine
Billion Names of God which describes a project undertaken by Tibetan monks to
decode and list all the names of God as they believed this was the ultimate
purpose of creation, and once the naming was complete then God would end the
Universe. To write the names out by hand would take many centuries, so, with
the help of two Western computer engineers, they devise a program for their Auto-
mated Sequence Computer Mark V which will complete the exercise within three
months. Confident in their belief that nothing will happen, the engineers plan
their return to civilisation to coincide with the final print run. As the final names
are printed and the pair are standing in an airfield awaiting their plane, they
notice ‘overhead, without any fuss, the stars were going out’ one by one (Clarke,
2001: 417–22). The story characterises humankind as moving towards a final resol-
ution which is absolute catastrophe and death, accelerated by technology. The
exhausted monks assign all their efforts and actions through history to a machine
which transforms their energies and substance into pure data, resulting in the event-
ual disappearance of the world. Baudrillard claims the rise of our reliance on tech-
nology is purposive because it represents an abdication of the responsibility to
nurture our own intelligence through gaining knowledge. He explains:
[I]f men create intelligent machines, or fantasize about them […] it is because they
secretly despair of their own intelligence […] By entrusting this burdensome intelligence
to machines we are released from any responsibility to knowledge, much as entrusting
power to politicians allows us to disdain any aspiration of our own to power. (Baudril-
lard, 1996: 51)
The adoption of mediating technologies which remove the need or will to think is
perceived to signify an indifference to our own human nature, characteristic of a
‘depersonalised and groundless society distracted from the realities of life’, such as
poverty, injustice, racism, and ageism (Marx & Engels, 1978: 349). As we spend
more time interacting with various applications than each other, there is a danger
of losing our sense of a distinct self, as bonded to others by means of historically con-
tingent spatial and temporal attachments which connect to tradition, beliefs, and
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moral attitudes. Defined by particular desires (becoming more object-oriented than
instinct oriented), our relationships with others and objects become centred on the
fulfilment of particular needs, utility, satisfaction, and use-value (Baudrillard,
2002: 72–73). Along with the functional properties of the web, the pursuit of self-
satisfaction and those objects which deliver gratification seem rather meagre aspira-
tions of this new order. All that is left once socio-culture, historical particularity, and
our communal sense of identity are obfuscated, diluted, and lost is an abstract
present or perpetual now, which is more concerned with simulacra than material
objects or authentic subjects.
From homo economicus to homo semioticus
In Simulations, Baudrillard presents all aspects of life as being part of a structural
process of communication comprising a system of ‘signs’, also referred to as simula-
crum, image, and model. In the first of his four stages of the sign, it is a true and
opaque reflection of reality — this is the mirror phase. In the second stage, the
sign masks, disfigures, and obscures those natural properties which render an
object real. In the third stage, the sign conceals the absence of any reality: the sign
itself pretends to be real by taking on the appearance of — resembling — reality.
The final stage sees a reversal of the relationship so that the sign precedes reality;
it is pure simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1983: 6). The system of signs which refers to
an infinite range of signifiers has now been modified in its relation with machine-led
technology, so that the human subject is subsumed into a commodified and reified
system of signification. In this way, the objective world of reality has been replaced
by hyperreality. So it becomes pertinent to ask what becomes of the body, the
emotions, and the social. For Baudrillard, hyperreality is the end product of a his-
torical simulation process in which the natural world and all its referents are pro-
gressively replaced by technology and self-referential signs. Consequently, there is
little to support the idea of the social or legal subject qua human in this ‘order of
simulacra’ or appearances. Ultimate meaning is found only within a closed and self-
referential system of codes which constitutes both the end-point, and negation, of
the law of value.
The ubiquity of the ‘code’ and the sign constitute an infinite regression of self-
reference and, for Baudrillard, this typifies the same Marxian notions of alienation
and reification which underscore the controlling culture of capitalist consumption. It
is ultimatelywewho are consumed and thereafter endlessly reproduced as simulacra
and simulation in the realm of hyperreality. He offers a three-stage process of (1) the
replacement of production, based on the relationship between labour and capital, as
the ordering principle of society, which led to mass production; then (2) consump-
tion, the consumer society; and finally (3) social reproduction in the form of the
knowledge industries and information processes for example. This is the final
stage of history in which the simulacrum (the replica, mirror image, our doppelgän-
ger) and the interplay of signs replaces production, class conflict, and other elements
of the political economy. According to this paradigm, from now on all social life is
organised into abstract categories as manipulated by cybernetic models. In the con-
cluding pages of The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures, Baudrillard (1998)
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refers to the 1930s silent German expressionist film ‘The Student of Prague’, which
portrays a Faustian bargain in which the student relinquishes part of himself, his
image, for money.
[A]n impoverished but ambitious student, Balduin, sells his mirror image to the Devil
and thereby enters the whirl of high society. However, his image, become flesh and
blood, appears to him and begins to follow him, apparently seeking revenge for
having been sold. In fear he hides from public view only to discover that his double
has now replaced him in society. In despair the student resolves to kill his doppelgänger
and when it appears in his room and passes between him and the mirror from which it
emerged, he fires a pistol at it. The mirror shatters, the phantom vanishes, but the student
himself collapses to the floor, dying. In killing his image he kills himself. Yet in losing his
life he finds salvation as, with his dying glance, he sees himself as himself: restored within
a broken shard of the looking glass. (Pawlett, 2007: 154 AQ10
¶
)
The film dramatises a form of contemporary alienation, in which, although we may
exist, there is a loss of unconscious meaning in the projected mirror image. An essen-
tial part of our nature escapes from us in this process (our essence or soul), yet we are
incapable of escaping it so it is forever present in its aching absence. In other words,
the transparency of our relation to the world is expressed by our unimpaired relation
to the image in the mirror and symbolically this indicates reciprocity between the
world and oneself. When this connection is broken or weakened, or if the image
is missing, it signifies the world is becoming opaque and we have no perspective
on our identity — as if we are at once estranged from ourselves. Separated by its
owner, the mirror is solid and takes on a magical life of its own, yet the alienated
person is not merely diminished, rather, he is ‘turned inside out, changed into some-
thing evil, into [his] own enemy, set against [himself]’ (Baudrillard, 1998: 190).
According to this hypothesis, there is nothing left with which to protect us from
the ‘obscenity’ and excess of the virtual as ‘we are no longer the actors of the real
world, but double agents of the virtual’ (Baudrillard, 1995: 125 AQ11
¶
).
Baudrillard explains that, in the specular sense ‘there is no longer any soul, no
shadow, no double’ and, therefore, ‘no longer any contradiction within being, or
any problematic of being and appearance’ (1998: 191). This ‘final irreversibility’
has imploded any distinction between reality and the imaginary, being and appear-
ance, knowledge and belief. The social, cultural, and economic realm is characterised
by an assortment of fleeting and disconnected ‘floating signifiers’which are free from
any objective grounding. As Bauman states in Postmodern Ethics: ‘all things stand
ultimately for nothing but themselves — there is no division between things that
mean and things that are meant’ (2000: 36). The artificial world of simulation func-
tions on the basis that ‘signs are exchanged against each other rather than against the
real— on condition that they are no longer exchanged against the real’ (Baudrillard,
1993: 7). The current condition of late modernity means simulacra are no longer
associated with any authentic referent; there is simply nothing behind the codes,
signs, and images that circulate detached from any real material objects or emotional
attachments. Recent research has examined the impact of the internet, in particular
Google, on the traditional human stratagem — the transactive memory system —
for sharing information or remembering events. The transference of information
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between friends and families or professional specialists such as doctors, lawyers, and
librarians typically took place via face-to-face interaction, while these exchanges are
now more likely to be impersonal and mediated by Google. Just as the values of the
Catholic Church captured the medieval consciousness, it is suggested this unquestion-
ing reliance on, and trust of, digital information systems has blurred the line between
our own human capacity for knowledge retention and that of the web: ‘As we offload
responsibility for many types of information to the internet, we may be replacing
other potential memory partners — friends, family members and other human
experts — with our ever-present connection to the seemingly omniscient digital
cloud’ (Wegner & Ward, 2013). This late modern era is, therefore, characterised
by Baudrillard as an era of ‘radical alienation’ because culture, sexuality, and
human relations no longer offer the possibility of transcendence, as all options are
pre-coded and based on models of consumption within a system of signs under
which ‘the human being is currently domesticating itself by means of its technologies
[…] submitting collectively to the same rituals as insects’ (Baudrillard, 1994: 84). The
utility and ubiquity of communicative technologies have fuelled a culture of compul-
sion and, in this way, that culture is privileged over what is lost by the uncritical
acceptance even absorption by such totalising forms of mediation.
The ability of signs to imitate, and even disfigure, real objects and ideas has
resulted in the proliferation of artificial representations of natural phenomena in
our relationships, aesthetic objects, and architecture. In semiotic terminology, these
signs ‘play’ at mirroring the real, feigning authenticity in order to mimic nature. In
the UK, shiny new shopping centres depict tropical rainforests and museums recreate
working coal mines while simultaneously most of the latter have closed with disas-
trous consequences for entire communities. Historic town centres and villages are
economically marginalised by these simulated cities of consumption, while the orig-
inal loci of social life have become peripheral (Shaw, 2008). A Baudrillardian view
would be that, as nature and history are simulated to vanishing point, there will
soon be no difference between the Industrial Revolution and its commemoration at
the 2012 London Olympic Games. Baudrillard uses the paradigm of the shopping
complex, or hypermarket, as the new model for social relations because of the
manner in which it subverts the idea of regular living conditions and habits. Tra-
ditionally, communities have been formed around the locus of an agora— a political
and commercial centre — from which the city has extended organically over time.
The hypermarket, rather, imposes an artificial environment served by a programmed
traffic infrastructure usually accompanied by new housing developments, in order to
supply these deterritorialised poles of simulation with a workforce. The new centres
of consumption have no past and no future; they no longer have anything to do with
the idea of a city or a people (Baudrillard, 1995: 77–78 AQ12
¶
). These new public spaces are
non-places in that they lack the symbolic expressions of identity, history, and culture
and therefore comprise empty places to which no meaning is attributed. The gap
between artifice and nature is lost as ‘the territory no longer precedes the map […]
it is the map that precedes the territory’ (Baudrillard, 2003: 1–2). As a result of
our technologies, it could be said that we inhabit a transformed space which is not
even a simulacrum of the old world, rather, it constitutes a world beyond, without
death — without ends and without end.
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Conclusion
The contemporary information order, unlike classical states or institutions, is a
society connected by an inexhaustible range of disembedded networks of human-
machine mobile interfaces with the capability of meeting face-to-face often at oppo-
site ends of the globe to exchange ideas, thoughts, and messages without the need for
physical transportation. An evolving medium, it is too soon to reliably envisage the
fullest consequences of information and communications technology and, although
there are many obvious positive implications, it is not a neutral medium. As human
thinking and decision making are increasingly dependent on a range of technologies,
this makes control of a mass-produced, simulated reality an attractive proposition to
a range of known and anonymous self-interested public and private profit-motivated
organisations. Informational capital is already dominated by corporate interests as
demonstrated by the total assets of just two of the top telecommunications corpor-
ations: AT&T and Verizon. At a combined total of US$551.9 billion at the end of
2013, both companies have revenues larger than the GDPs of Ireland, Portugal,
the Philippines, or even Nigeria (Fortune 500, 2012; World Bank, 2013).
However we interpret the impact of this advanced technological age, it is organised
according to a new data-gathering, surveillance-oriented, knowledge-power regime
which operates at the micro level in the capillaries of society. In this current climate
of endless technological transformation, along with the growth of surveillance tech-
nology together with the expansion of regulatory state powers, it is clear that any
further innovations cannot be left to market forces.
It is no longer possible to understand humanity, civilisation, and social organis-
ation without appreciating the role played by technology; however, thus far there
is no formal or settled critical theory of ICT. Yet, if we are to avoid real life becoming
empty representation along with an inexorable decline in human moral status, there
is a pressing need to critically evaluate those structures which underpin the messages
transmitted by individuals and institutions with the ability to fashion identities,
shape culture, and even assemble entire realities. Just as, at a human level, rational
thought processes restrain ideas which are unruly and require control, ICTadvance-
ments have proliferated to the point where these technologies also need to be classi-
fied, restrained where necessary, and diluted into the real world in real time. Due to
the multi-dimensional nature of such an extensive project, nothing less than a holis-
tic response is sufficient which connects inter alia biological scientists, technologists,
political scientists, organisational theorists, sociologists, philosophers, and even
poets and writers of science fiction. This is because only by meeting the posthuman
challenge with critical creativity and forging new alliances between natural, life,
human, and social sciences is it possible to begin to purposefully reimagine a sustain-
able future for humans alongside their nonhuman others in a cultural posthuman
world.
Note
1 HL Debate, 13 May 2014, col. 1749.
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